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Combatant’s Privilege Reconsidered 
Harry van der Linden 
Abstract 
 
International law grants to legitimate combatants the right to kill enemy soldiers both in wars 
of aggression and defensive wars. A main argument in support of this “combatant’s privilege” 
is Michael Walzer’s doctrine of the “moral equality of soldiers.” The doctrine argues that 
soldiers fighting in wars of aggression and defensive wars have the same moral status 
because they both typically believe that justice is on their side, and their moral choices are 
equally severely restricted by the overwhelming coercive powers of the state, including 
propaganda, conscription, and harsh penalties for the refusal to fight. Recently, this doctrine 
has been convincingly refuted, at least with regard to aggressor soldiers who are part of 
professional volunteer armies in democratic societies. However, Walzer’s critics have not 
challenged combatant’s privilege, primarily for a variety of pragmatic reasons. This paper 
examines these reasons, finds them not decisive, and articulates a modest proposal for 
denying, under some conditions, combatant’s privilege to aggressor soldiers, making their 
very participation in a war of aggression a war crime. It is concluded that unrestricted 
combatant’s privilege is in tension with the aim of the United Nations “to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war.”  
 
 
 We commonly see the killing of human beings, except in cases of true self-defense, 
as a horrendous moral crime deserving the most severe legal punishment.  Yet, we 
commonly accept that individuals have a legal right to kill persons on a large scale 
once some legitimate authority, in particular the state, puts them in uniform, provides 
them with weapons, and commands them to execute a war. What is remarkable and 
morally questionable concerning this “combatant’s privilege” is that international law 
and custom grant it irrespective of the reasons behind the war. In other words, 
soldiers have a right to kill whether their fight is an act of pure aggression or an act of 
pure self-defense. To be sure, the combatant’s right to kill is restricted in that it is a 
war crime to deliberately kill enemy noncombatants, notably civilians not directly 
engaged in defense and soldiers hors de combat.  However, it still means that the 
war convention grants combatants authorized by their governments to fight a war of 
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aggression the legal right to kill enemy soldiers who rightfully seek to protect their 
country and fellow citizens. Moreover, the war convention permits these aggressor 
soldiers to indirectly kill enemy civilians in pursuit of their military objectives as long 
as this “collateral damage” is proportional to the importance of these objectives.   
A major argument in support of combatant’s privilege is Michael Walzer’s 
doctrine of the “moral equality of soldiers.” On his account, soldiers fighting in wars of 
aggression and defensive wars have the same moral status because they both 
typically believe that justice is on their side, and their moral choices are equally 
severely restricted by the overwhelming coercive powers of the state, including 
propaganda, conscription, and harsh penalties for the refusal to fight.1  Walzer’s 
doctrine conflates the implausible view that soldiers fighting a war of aggression do 
not commit a moral wrong by killing enemy soldiers with the more plausible view that 
aggressor soldiers should not be held morally liable for their wrongful killings of 
enemy soldiers.  However, recent critics of Walzer’s doctrine, such as Jeff McMahan 
and J. Joseph Miller, have convincingly shown that even in the latter form his 
doctrine is to be rejected.2 In a word, the major problem with Walzer’s doctrine is that 
time has caught up with it: his characterization of aggressor soldiers as poorly 
informed instruments of the state bereft of any real freedom of action fits ill with the 
position of soldiers in the modern professional volunteer army in democratic 
societies. These soldiers can decline to serve; they have the opportunity and 
competency to assess the military conflicts of their country; and so they can be held 
morally responsible for participating in wars of aggression.  And the future may only 
further outdate Walzer’s doctrine in that the current trend is to increasingly make use 
of private military contractors fighting side by side with regular armed forces.  
Granted that soldiers, especially in democratic societies with professional 
volunteer armies, can be held morally culpable for fighting a war of aggression, 
should they be denied combatant’s privilege?  Moral culpability of aggressor soldiers 
establishes a necessary condition for modifying combatant’s privilege, not a sufficient 
one.  Indeed, the recent critics of Walzer’s doctrine of the moral equality of soldiers 
have argued against modifying this privilege.  For them, it is simply important as such 
to establish that soldiers may be culpable, or the argument’s main pay-off is that 
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some soldiers may refuse to fight in a war of aggression.  What holds these critics 
back from challenging the current laws of war? 
McMahan offers in synoptic fashion three arguments against the notion that 
combatant’s privilege might be denied to aggressor soldiers so that they become 
appropriate subjects for some form of punishment: First, it is simply impossible for 
one country, or even an international body, to provide fair trials for all the members of 
an army. Second, there is the problem of “victor’s justice”: the winning side will 
declare its war to have been just and will be tempted to seek vengeance against 
vanquished soldiers under the guise of punishment. Third, if all combatants have to 
fear this fate, they may be deterred from surrendering; and it is irrational to establish 
incentives to protract wars rather than to terminate them.3 
A fourth objection is a variant of the last one: once soldiers fear prosecution for 
fighting an unjust war, they may have a reduced interest in not committing traditional 
war crimes (such as directly killing noncombatants).  Their reasoning might be that 
since their capture might lead them to be convicted in any case, having a charge 
added of having committed traditional war crimes might not make much difference.  
Let me first address the last two objections since they have less weight.  It is 
correct that it is important not to provide incentives for lengthening wars by 
discouraging surrender, but it is even more important in terms of reducing human 
suffering to provide incentives for not initiating wars of aggression in the first place. 
The prosecution of unjust combatants will reduce the willingness of combatants to 
participate in wars of aggression, especially in the case of professional volunteer 
armies.4 Of course, the prosecution of the leaders of wars of aggression also has this 
impact, but the two are not exclusive and the prosecution of soldiers may be more 
effective in the long run.  After all, it is more difficult for aggressor combatants to 
escape prosecution than it is for political and military leaders.  The problem of a 
reduced incentive for surrendering by soldiers who fear prosecution can also be 
rebutted directly by a stipulation that surrender is a ground for dropping prosecution 
charges of aggressor combatancy or for reducing the penalty.  The disincentive for 
not committing traditional war crimes can be removed in a similar way by making the 
penalty of aggressor combatancy a much less severe one. This is also morally 
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imperative in that in general more extenuating circumstances are in place for 
committing the wrong of fighting in a war of aggression than in committing traditional 
war crimes. 
The first two objections against changing combatant’s privilege involving the 
problems of feasibility and “victor’s justice” can best be met by articulating fair and 
feasible procedures for determining and prosecuting aggressor combatancy.  What 
follows is a cautious and preliminary proposal in this direction, mindful of the fact that 
we should avoid taking a step backward toward a vision of war as a punitive 
enterprise.  
Suppose that a country prepares to go to war (and so the war is not a war of 
reactive self-defense).  Suppose further that the Security Council condemns the war 
preparation as an unjust act against a sovereign state.  Under the current 
composition and voting procedures of the Security Council, this declaration of an act 
of war as illegal is bound to be a selective judgment in the sense that all members 
with veto power, as well as, presumably, affiliated friendly nations, will avoid such a 
judgment (even if it would be warranted). So assume that the Security Council 
surrenders its veto system, increases its membership, becomes more representative 
of the global community, and operates through a voting system of a two-third’s 
majority.  Now if this Security Council declares, both before and after the outbreak of 
hostilities, that a given country’s non-reactive act of war is illegal and divulges this 
decision as widely as possible, then the soldiers of this country lack combatant’s 
privilege. Their killing becomes a war crime and should be prosecuted with the same 
protections in place as the prosecution of traditional war crimes. Excusing conditions 
include duress and lack of knowledge, making the prosecution of soldiers from closed 
societies much less likely than the prosecution of soldiers from democratic societies 
with professional volunteer armies. Prosecution should take place by an international 
judicial body similar to the International Criminal Court, or, at least, such a body 
should supervise the prosecution.  Both feasibility and moral considerations demand 
that penalties generally be modest.  Repeat offenders should receive harsher 
penalties. Rank could be taken into account, and it might be practically necessary in 
some cases to pursue only officers.  Feasibility and moral considerations might 
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necessitate that alternatives to traditional penalties are pursued, such as that 
aggressor combatants in custody would participate in truth and reconciliation 
hearings prior to their return to their home country.  
Filling out the details of this proposal falls outside my competency as a political 
philosopher concerned with issues of war and peace; it is a task that should be taken 
up by international law scholars.  It might turn out that there are legal obstacles that 
are difficult and perhaps even too costly to overcome.  So let me end with a modest, 
yet important, conclusion. The United Nations was created with the intent “to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”  The laws of war predate the 
United Nations, even though their formalization in various conventions has mostly 
taken place in later years.  The laws of war are based on a more realist premise, 
seeking only to restrict the scourge of war.5  There is no doubt that the laws of war 
have contributed to this aim.  At the same time, we should not give up on the more 
ambitious goal of the United Nations.  In my view, we face a future in which 
unrestricted combatant’s privilege might increasingly be an obstacle to enduring 
global peace because, for one thing, we face a future in which fewer soldiers with 
more effective weapons can be paid to pursue aggressive designs.  More generally, 
the current laws of war create a zone of legally permitted killing by combatants even 
in cases where this is undeniably morally reprehensible.  In practice, this influences 
the moral assessment of aggressor combatants in the wrong direction, just as its 
legal condemnation and prosecution would have the reverse moral impact, even if 
punishment would remain largely symbolic.  It would be unwise to modify the laws of 
war and set aside the principle of the equality of combatants if it would increase the 
suffering inflicted by soldiers during war, but the case for this happening is not clear 
cut. So, for the sake of global peace, we should at least be willing to reconsider 





                                                
1	   See	  Michael	  Walzer,	   Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars,	   3rd	  edition	   (New	  York:	  basic	  Books,	  2000),	  pp.	  40-­‐41	  and	  
127-­‐28.	  	  
 6 
                                                                                                                                                       
	  	  2	  See	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  “The	  Ethics	  of	  Killing	  in	  War,”	  Philosophia	  34	  (2006):	  23-­‐41,	  and	  J.	  Joseph	  Miller,	  
“Jus	   ad	   bellum	   and	   an	   Officer’s	  Moral	   Obligations:	   Invincible	   Ignorance,	   the	   Constitutions,	   and	   Iraq,”	  
Social	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  30	  (October	  2004):	  457-­‐84.	  	  
3	  McMahan,	  “The	  Ethics	  of	  Killing	  in	  War,”	  p,	  38.	  	  	  
4	  Cf.	  Christopher	  Kutz,	   “The	  Difference	  Uniforms	  Make:	  Collective	  Violence	   in	  Criminal	   Law	  and	  War,”	  
Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs	  33	  (Spring	  2005):	  148-­‐80,	  pp.	  167-­‐68.	  	  
5	   See	   Francois	   Bugnion,	   “Just	   wars,	   wars	   of	   aggression,	   and	   international	   humanitarian	   law,”	  
International	  Review	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  (September	  2002):	  523-­‐46.	  	  Translated	  from	  French	  and	  posted	  on	  
the	  website	  of	  the	  ICRC,	  http://	  www.icrc.org.	   
